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Abstract
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a gen-
eralized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper
hemi–continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile,
and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized best reply correspon-
dence we define a generalized best reply dynamics as a differential inclusion based
on it. We call a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles a minimally asymptotically
stable face (MASF) if it is asymptotically stable under some such dynamics and
no subface of it is asymptotically stable under any such dynamics. The set of such
correspondences (and dynamics) is endowed with the partial order of point-wise
set-inclusion and, under a mild condition on the normal form of the game at hand,
forms a complete lattice with meets based on point-wise intersections. The refined
best reply correspondence is then defined as the smallest element of the set of all
generalized best reply correspondences. We ultimately find that every Kalai and
Samet’s (1984) persistent retract, which coincide with Basu and Weibull’s (1991)
CURB sets based, however, on the refined best reply correspondence, contains a
MASF. Conversely, every MASF must be a Voorneveld’s (2004) prep set, again,
however, based on the refined best reply correspondence.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary support for Nash equilibrium behavior in general finite n-player games is
mixed. On the one hand, strict Nash equilibria (which necessarily must be in pure strate-
gies) are evolutionarily stable (multipopulation ESS, see e.g. (Weibull 1995, Definition
5.1)) and asymptotically stable under the multi-population replicator dynamics. In fact,
strict Nash equilibria are the only asymptotically stable states under the multi-population
replicator dynamics and other related imitation-based dynamics as shown by Ritzberger
and Weibull (1995). Of course, many games of interest do not have a strict Nash equilib-
rium.
On the other hand, mixed Nash equilibria, which do exist in every finite normal form
game, do not have a lot of evolutionary support in general games. To demonstrate this
point Hofbauer and Swinkels (1995) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2003) consider a class of
finite normal form games, in which each game has a unique but mixed Nash equilibrium,
and show that any “reasonable” (deterministic continuous time) dynamic process must
fail to make this unique Nash equilibrium asymptotically stable in at least one of these
games.
We, thus, have to abandon the hope of obtaining Nash equilibria as the only outcomes
of evolutionary processes. Yet, this is not the end of studying the outcome of evolution.
One just has to accept that evolution will lead to, at least in some games, a set of states,
which may also include some non-Nash equilibrium states. It may still be the case that
these evolutionary stable sets are quite manageable and useful for the analysis of games
in practice. Note that the switch from strategy profiles to sets of strategy profiles has also
been necessary in the study of Nash equilibrium refinements (see Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986)) and the study of the consequences of common knowledge of rationality in general
games (see e.g. Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)).
Given the evolutionary appeal of some pure strategy profiles it suggests itself to study
setwise generalizations of pure strategy profiles. A useful generalization of a pure strategy
profile is given by a face (of the polyhedron of mixed strategy profiles) that is simply
obtained by choosing a subset of pure strategies for every player and then considering all
independent mixtures over these subsets.
We are not the first to propose to study the evolutionary stability properties of such
faces. Indeed Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) identify faces which are asymptotically sta-
ble under a large class of imitation-based dynamics. These faces are spanned by what
Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) call cuwbr sets (these are product sets of pure strategy
profiles that are closed under weakly better replies). Unless a minimal cuwbr set is a
singleton, it does not contain a strict Nash equilibrium, but must contain a (possibly
mixed) Nash equilibrium.
There are two (related) drawbacks of Ritzberger and Weibull’s (1995) result. First,
in many games even the smallest cuwbr sets are very large sets. Thus, their predictive
power is limited. Second, and this is a possible reason for their limited predictive power,
the dynamics that these sets are based on, while plausible in some settings, are not
necessarily the most plausible in games with highly rational and highly informed players.
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More rational and informed players might not adapt their strategies towards better replies
so very gradually as is implicit in the class of dynamics of Ritzberger and Weibull (1995).
One alternative with sharper predictions (smaller asymptotically stable sets) and more
plausible adjustment behavior for highly rational and informed human beings is the best
reply dynamics of Gilboa and Matsui (1991), Matsui (1992), and Hofbauer (1995) (in the
spirit of fictitious play). To see the differences between Ritzberger and Weibull’s (1995)
imitation-based dynamics and the best reply dynamics in terms of the sharpness of their
prediction consider the following 2-player game.
H T C
H 4,0 0,4 2,
T 0,4 4,0 2,
C ,2 ,2 ,
Game 1: A game to demonstrate the difference between imitation-based and best reply dynamics.
For  ∈ (0, 2) Game 1, which is matching pennies with an additional (constant payoff)
strategy, has a unique smallest cuwbr set, the set of all strategy profiles. It is easy to see
that both H and T need to be in any minimal cuwbr set for both players. However, the
unique minimal cuwbr set also includes pure strategy C even if  is very close to 0. To
see this note that when play is, for instance, sufficiently close to H,H strategy C is better
than strategy H for player 2 (and, thus, better than the average strategy employed by all
individuals in player population 2). Under any dynamics considered in Ritzberger and
Weibull (1995) the share of C strategists in population 2 must then grow for some finite
amount of time.
Yet, for all  ∈ (0, 2) strategy C is strictly dominated for both players by the mixed
strategy that puts equal weight on H and T. Thus, if a human being were to play this
game, and were told the current state of play and allowed to change her behavior, it seems
unlikely that this human being would choose strategy C. Indeed, under the best reply
dynamics strategy C will never be adopted by any revising agent. Thus, the best reply
dynamics will eliminate C from any initial state. The unique minimal asymptotically
stable face under the best reply dynamics is the face spanned by the unique minimal
CURB set (as defined by Basu and Weibull (1991)) {H,T} × {H,T}.
Hurkens (1995) analyzes a stochastic variant of the best reply dynamics. To be more
precise, he studies a stochastic version of fictitious play, in which players play best replies
to samples from their memory as in the model of Young (1993). Hurkens (1995) shows
that the limiting invariant distribution of the resulting Markov chain attaches probability
1 to the set of all minimal CURB sets. Analogously one can prove that CURB sets are
asymptotically stable under the best reply dynamics.1
Even when an imitation-based dynamics and the best reply dynamics yield the same
collection of asymptotically stable sets of states, their vector fields are very different. To
see this consider the following simple 2-player 2-strategy game.
1This follows from Lemma 7 in this paper.
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L R
T 1,1 1,1
B 1,1 0,0
Game 2: A game to demonstrate the behavioral differences in imitation-based and best reply dynamics.
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Figure 1: The vector fields of the replicator and best reply dynamics for Game 2.
Note that pure strategies B and R are weakly dominated for players 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Figure 1 sketches the vector fields of the two dynamics for this game, where p
denotes the proportion of T in player population 1 and q the proportion of L in player
population 2. The replicator dynamics takes play from an interior state to a possibly
(weakly) dominated Nash equilibrium state on the boundary. Thus, different initial
states, under the replicator dynamics, lead to different, often weakly dominated, Nash
equilibrium outcomes. A consequence of this fact is that all Nash equilibrium boundary
states are Lyapunov stable, yet none are asymptotically stable (not even the undominated
equilibrium T,L).
The best reply dynamics, on the other hand, from any interior state converges in
a straight line to the undominated Nash equilibrium T,L. However, there is something
the above picture does not show. Because the best reply dynamics is a differential in-
clusion, there can be several trajectories emanating from the same point. This happens
here precisely for all the Nash equilibria. Here, this implies that there are solutions to
the best reply dynamics that move gradually along the boundary. Thus, T,L is NOT
Lyapunov stable because there are trajectories starting arbitrarily nearby and leave any
neighborhood. Only the whole Nash equilibrium component is asymptotically stable.
In this paper we take the view that this difficulty is due to inessential and superfluous
trajectories. In fact, if one took the view that rational and informed human beings would
never adopt dominated strategies, by, for instance, only playing cautious best responses
(as defined by Pearce (1984)), then the resulting cautious best-reply dynamics would make
T,L the unique minimal asymptotically stable face.
Hurkens (1995) considers a second stochastic variant of the best-reply dynamics, in
which individuals restrict themselves to playing semi-robust best replies, as defined by
Balkenborg (1992). A definition of semi-robust best replies is also given in this paper. At
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this point it suffices to say that the set of semi-robust best-replies to a particular strategy
profile is a (sometimes proper) subset of the set of all best replies to this strategy profile.
Hurkens (1995) shows that the limiting invariant distribution of the resulting Markov
chain in this second model attaches probability 1 to the set of persistent retracts (as
defined by Kalai and Samet (1984)). For the simple 2-player 2-strategy game above this
implies that only the undominated pure Nash equilibrium T,L receives limiting probability
1. Generally, persistent retracts are faces that are typically smaller, never larger, than
minimal CURB sets. To be more precise, every minimal CURB set contains a possibly
much smaller persistent retract. Similarly every minimal cuwbr set contains a possibly
much smaller minimal CURB set.
Motivated by the results of Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) and Hurkens (1995) we
are, in this paper, interested in identifying and characterizing the smallest faces that are
evolutionary stable under some reasonable dynamics (appropriate for highly rational and
informed human beings). To make our quest more specific we restrict attention to best re-
ply like dynamics. This is motivated by the intuitive appeal of best responding for highly
rational and informed human beings as well as the fact that Ritzberger and Weibull’s
(1995) asymptotically stable minimal cuwbr sets are typically much larger than the mini-
mal CURB sets or persistent retracts that Hurkens (1995) identifies as the outcome of his
two variants of Young’s (1993) model of best-reply learning. To perform our search in a
systematic way we define and study a large class of generalized best reply dynamics,
which is supposed to contain all reasonable best reply like dynamics.2
We can thus define a minimally asymptotically stable face (MASF) as a face that is
asymptotically stable under some generalized best reply dynamics with the additional
property that it does not contain a proper subface that is also asymptotically stable
under some, possibly different, generalized best reply dynamics. Note that it may seem
well possible that the dynamics that makes one MASF asymptotically stable in one game
is quite different from the dynamics that makes another MASF asymptotically stable in
another game. Our first main result, however, shows that this is not possible. In fact,
under a mild restrictions on the class of games we can study, there is a single dynamics,
the same for all games, that determines which faces are MASFs and which are not. That
is, a face is a MASF if and only if it is a minimally asymptotically stable face under this
particular dynamics. We are thus justified in terming this dynamics the (most) refined
best reply dynamics.
The refined best reply dynamics is a very reasonable and intuitive dynamics (for highly
rational and highly informed individuals). The following micro-story is based on and
adapted from Hofbauer’s (1995) story that gives rise to the best reply dynamics. For every
player position there is a large population of individuals. Time is continuous and runs
from 0 to infinity. Individuals always play a pure strategy. At time 0 individuals’ behavior
is given by some arbitrary frequency distribution of pure strategies, one distribution for
each population. In every short time interval a small fraction of individuals is given
the opportunity to revise their strategy. When doing so individuals know the aggregate
2This class also contains some unreasonable dynamics. It will become clear in the analysis, however,
that this does not pose a problem for the interpretation of our results.
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distribution of play (the state of play). If there is a unique best reply a revising individual
adopts it. If there are multiple best replies a revising individual considers them all, but
only adopts one that is also a unique best reply in an open set of nearby states of play.
One could call this a cautious myopically rational individual.3 One similar alternative
story could be that revising individuals do not know the exact state of play. Different
individuals have different beliefs (which are close to the truth) about the aggregate play.
If these beliefs are sufficiently diverse only a vanishing fraction of individuals will adopt
a strategy that is best only on a thin set of states of play. This gives again rise to the
refined best reply dynamics.
Interestingly the refined best reply dynamics is based on Balkenborg’s (1992) semi-
robust best replies, and, thus, in some sense analogous to the second stochastic model of
learning studied by Hurkens (1995). This then gives rise to the question whether MASFs
are exactly those faces that Hurkens (1995) identifies as the long-run outcome of his
learning process namely persistent retracts. Somewhat surprisingly, the answer to this
question is no. There are MASFs in some games that are proper subfaces of persistent
retracts as we demonstrate by example. In an effort to at least partially characterize
MASFs in terms of known concepts from the literature, we ultimately show that every
persistent retract contains a MASF and every MASF must be an appropriate version of a
prep set (first defined by Voorneveld (2004)). The appropriate version is not the original
prep set, which is based on the best reply correspondence, but such that it is based on
the refined best reply correspondence, which underlies the refined best reply dynamics.
Methodologically there is some overlap of this paper with Balkenborg (1992) who, in
order to analyze the properties of persistent retracts, studies the “semi-robust best reply
correspondence”, which differs from the refined best reply correspondences considered
here by not being convex valued. Balkenborg, Jansen, and Vermeulen (2001) analyze the
invariance of persistent retracts and equilibria using “sparse strategy selections”. These
are particulary useful when no unique minimal refined best reply correspondence exists.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first define the class of games we study in section 2.
We then define the class of generalized best reply correspondences in section 3, where we
also prove its lattice structure and the existence of a unique smallest element. In section 4
we study the notion of a CURB set (Basu and Weibull (1991)) and a prep set4 (Voorneveld
(2004)) for all generalized best reply correspondences and study their relationship. We
there also prove that CURB sets based on the refined best reply correspondence coincide
with Kalai and Samet’s (1984) persistent retracts. Section 5, finally, provides the main
result that persistent retracts are asymptotically stable under the refined best reply dy-
namics and thus contain a MASF and that every MASF must be a tight prep set based on
the refined best reply correspondence. Section 6 concludes. The paper has one appendix,
where we show in which sense our restriction to games with generically unique best replies
is not essential.
3The behavior of a revising individual is reminiscent of, yet not completely the same as playing Pearce’s
(1984) cautious response.
4A learning model which leads to the original prep sets of Voorneveld (2004) is given by Kets and
Voornefeld (2008).
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2 Preliminaries
Let Γ = (I, S, u) be a finite n-player normal form game, where I = {1, ..., n} is the
set of players, S = ×i∈ISi is the set of pure strategy profiles, and u : S → IRn the
payoff function5. Let Θi = ∆(Si) denote
6 the set of player i’s mixed strategies, and let
Θ = ×i∈IΘi denote the set of all mixed strategy profiles. Let int(Θ) = {x ∈ Θ : xis >
0 ∀s ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I} denote the set of all completely mixed strategy profiles.
A strategy profile x ∈ Θ may also represent a population state in an evolutionary
interpretation of the game in the following sense. Each player i ∈ I is replaced by
a population of agents playing in player position i and xisi denotes the proportion of
players in population i who play pure strategy si ∈ Si.
For x ∈ Θ let Bi(x) ⊂ Si denote the set of pure-strategy best-replies to x for player
i. Let B(x) = ×i∈IBi(x). Let βi(x) = ∆(Bi(x)) ⊂ Θi denote the set of mixed-strategy
best-replies to x for player i. Let β(x) = ×i∈Iβi(x).
Two strategies xi, yi ∈ Θi are own-payoff equivalent (for player i) if ui(xi, x−i) =
ui(yi, x−i) for all x−i ∈ Θ−i = ×j 6=iΘj (see Kalai and Samet (1984)). In contrast, Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986) call two strategies xi, yi ∈ Θi payoff equivalent if uj(xi, x−i) =
uj(yi, x−i) for all x−i ∈ Θ−i and for all players j ∈ I. We will use these concepts
primarily for pure strategies.
Let Ψ = {x ∈ Θ : B(x) is a singleton}. Notice that the unique best reply against a
strategy combination in Ψ is necessarily a pure strategy. Throughout this paper we will
restrict attention to games Γ for which this set Ψ is dense in Θ. Let this set of games be
denoted by G∗. A game Γ 6∈ G∗ is given by Game 3. Player 1’s best reply set is {A,B}
for any (mixed) strategy of player 2. Hence, β(x) is never a singleton and Ψ = ∅ is not
dense in Θ. This has to do with the fact that player 1 has two own-payoff equivalent pure
strategies.
C D
A 1,1 1,0
B 1,0 1,1
Game 3: A Game in which Ψ is not dense in Θ.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that without equivalent strategies Ψ is dense in Θ. The
following lemma, due to Kalai and Samet (1984), is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 Let U be a non-empty open subset of Θ. Then two strategies xi, yi ∈ Θi are
own-payoff equivalent (for player i) if and only if ui(xi, z−i) = ui(yi, z−i) for all z ∈ U .
Proposition 1 Let Γ be without own-payoff equivalent pure strategies. Then Ψ is dense
in Θ; i.e., Γ ∈ G∗.
5The function u will also denote the expected utility function in the mixed extension of the game Γ.
6Let, generally, ∆(K) for some finite set K denote the set of all probability distributions over K.
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Proof: Suppose Ψ is not dense in Θ. Then there is an open set U in Θ such that for
all y ∈ U the pure best reply set B(y) is not a singleton, i.e., has at least two elements.
Without loss of generality, due to the finiteness of S, we can assume that there are two
pure strategy-profiles si, ti ∈ Si such that si, ti ∈ Bi(y) for all y ∈ U and some player
i ∈ I. But then by Lemma 1, si and ti are own-payoff equivalent for player i. QED
Note that the converse of Proposition 1 is not true. Consider two own-payoff equivalent
strategies which are strictly dominated by another strategy. If these are the only equiv-
alent strategies in Γ then Ψ is still dense in Θ. However, the following proposition is
immediate. Call xi ∈ Θi a robust best reply against x ∈ Θ if xi is a best reply against
all strategy combinations in a neighborhood of x. Call xi ∈ Θi a robust strategy if xi
is a robust best reply against some strategy combination x ∈ Θ. This terminology is
inspired by Okada (1983).
Proposition 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let si ∈ Si be a robust strategy. Then player i has no distinct
own-payoff equivalent strategy to si in Si.
Still, games in the class G∗ are essentially those that do not have own-payoff equivalent
strategies for any player. The semi-reduced normal form of a game is usually obtained
by removing all payoff equivalent strategies. In the appendix we argue that the games
in which there are own-payoff equivalent strategies which are not payoff-equivalent are
exceptional. Hence the restriction to games in the class G∗ made throughout the paper is
essentially the restriction to the semi-reduced normal form7 in the sense of Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). Since we are primarily interested in the best reply correspondence this
restriction is largely without loss of generality. In fact, every trajectory of the best reply
dynamics of the reduced form of a normal form game corresponds in a canonical fashion
to a family of trajectories in the original game which projects onto it.
3 Generalized best reply correspondences
Definition 1 A correspondence τ : Θ ⇒ Θ is a generalized best reply correspon-
dence if
1. τ(x) = ×i∈Iτi(x) ∀ x ∈ Θ, where τi : Θ⇒ Θi for all i ∈ I,
2. τ is upper hemi–continuous8 at all x ∈ Θ,
3. τi(x) ∩ βi(x) 6= ∅ ∀ x ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ I,
4. τ(x) is convex and closed for all x ∈ Θ.
7In particular, we are, for instance, not ruling out games with weakly dominated strategies.
8Following (Aliprantis and Border 1999, ch.17.2), or (Ritzberger 2002, Def 5.8), the correspondence τ
is upper hemi–continuous at x if for every open set V ⊂ Θ with τ(x) ⊂ V there is an open subset U ⊂ Θ
with x ∈ U such that for all y ∈ U : τ(y) ⊂ V .
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Note that property 3 immediately implies that τ(x) 6= ∅. Thus, a generalized best reply
correspondence has the basic technical properties as the best reply correspondence β,
and is minimally connected to the best reply correspondence β by the requirement that
at least one best reply to some given strategy profile x, i.e. an element ∈ β(x), is also
available in τ(x).
A subclass of the set of generalized best reply correspondences of independent interest
is one that is based on pure strategies only, in the following sense. A correspondence
τ : Θ ⇒ Θ is a generalized best reply correspondence based on pure strategies
if it is a generalized best reply correspondence and property 4 is replaced by the more
stringent property 4∗ that τi(x) = ∆ (Ti(x)) for some Ti(x) ⊂ Si for all x ∈ Θ for all i ∈ I.
Then property 3 is equivalent to Ti(x) ∩ Bi(x) 6= ∅ for all x ∈ Θ and for all i ∈ I.
Let T = T (Γ) denote the set of all generalized best reply correspondences (of a game
Γ) and let T PS denote the subset of all generalized best reply correspondences based on
pure strategies.
One natural example of a correspondence in T but not in T PS is the correspondence
of all mixed weakly better replies. This is given by τ = ×i∈Iτi with τi(x) = {yi ∈ Θi :
ui(yi, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i)}.
One example of a correspondences in T PS is, of course, the best reply correspondence
itself. For another let Ti(x) = {si ∈ Si : ui(si, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i)}. I.e. Ti(x) is the set
of all weakly better replies to x−i given xi. The resulting correspondence is that of all
mixtures of pure weakly better replies (see Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)). Another one,
closely connected to the S∞W -procedure of Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), can be found
by letting Ti(x) be the set of all pure best replies, except weakly dominated ones.
The following example of a correspondence in T PS is key to the subsequent analysis
in this paper.
Definition 2 For games in G∗, for x ∈ Θ let
S i(x) = {si ∈ Si : ∃{xt}∞t=1 ∈ Ψ : xt → x ∧ Bi(xt) = {si} ∀t}.
Then σi(x) = ∆ (S i(x)) and σ(x) = ×i∈Iσi(x) ∀ x ∈ Θ. We call this correspondence
σ : Θ⇒ Θ, the (most) refined best reply correspondence.
The set S i(x) in the above definition is the set of pure semi-robust best replies defined in
Balkenborg (1992).
Given two correspondences τ, τ ′ ∈ T let τ ⊂ τ ′ if τ(x) ⊂ τ ′(x) for all x ∈ Θ. The
set T endowed with this notion of “smaller than” is a partial order, see e.g. (Davey and
Priestley 2002, Definition 1.2). Given two correspondences τ, τ ′ ∈ T let τ ′′ = τ ∧ τ ′ if
τ ′′i (x) = τi(x) ∩ τ ′i(x) and τ ′′(x) = ×i∈Iτ ′′i (x) for all x ∈ Θ.
The first Theorem of this paper demonstrates that for games in G∗ the set T of
generalized best reply correspondences has a lot of structure, and especially, a smallest
element. In fact the set T is a complete lattice, meaning that every subset of T has an
infimum (meet) and a supremum (join), see e.g. (Davey and Priestley 2002, Definition
2.4).
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Theorem 1 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Then
1. T is a complete lattice,
2. with a unique smallest element, which is given by σ, the refined best reply correspon-
dence,
3. with σ ∈ T PS.
Proof: Let T ′ be a non-empty subset of T . Define τ ∗ by τ ∗ (x) = ∩τ∈T ′τ (x) for all x ∈ Θ.
We claim that τ ∗ ∈ T . Since the intersection of products, convex sets and closed sets is
itself a product, convex and closed, τ ∗ has properties (1) and (4) of a generalized best
reply correspondence. Any τ ∈ T ′ is in fact compact valued. Θ is compact and Hausdorff
and therefore a regular topological space (Aliprantis and Border 1999, Theorem 2.48).
Hence, τ ∗ is upper hemi–continuous (Aliprantis and Border 1999, Theorem 17.25.3), i.e.
satisfies property (2) of a generalized best reply correspondence.
It remains to show property (3) of a generalized best reply correspondence. As Γ ∈ G∗,
by definition, β(x) is a singleton for all x ∈ Ψ, given by the pure strategy which is the
unique element of B(x). Thus, for all x ∈ Ψ, we have that β(x) ⊂ τ(x) for any τ ∈ T .
For x ∈ Ψ let S i(x) = Bi(x) for all i ∈ I. As Γ ∈ G∗ we have that Ψ is dense in
Θ. For x 6∈ Ψ let U ⊂ Θ be a neighborhood of x, let SUi (x) =
⋃
x′∈U∩Ψ Bi(x′), and let
S i(x) =
⋂
(U neighborhood of x) SUi (x). Let σi(x) = ∆ (S i(x)) and let σ(x) = ×i∈Iσi(x) ∀
x ∈ Θ. Thus, σ is the refined best reply correspondence.
Then, by the properties (2) and (4) of any τ ∈ T we must have that σ(x) ⊂ τ(x) for
all x 6∈ Ψ and thus for all x ∈ Θ, for all τ ∈ T . Thus, σ ⊂ τ ∗, and, thus, τ ∗ satisfies
property (3). It follows immediately that τ ∗ is the infimum of T ′ in T . The supremum
of T ′ is easily seen to be the the intersection of all upper bounds of T ′ in T . Thus T is
a complete lattice, proving part 1.
A complete lattice has a lowest element. Given that σ ⊂ τ for all τ ∈ T and σ ∈ T
this lowest element must be σ. This proves part 2. Part 3 immediately follows from the
construction of σ. QED
Note that Theorem 1 also implies that the set T PS is a complete lattice with the same
smallest element, σ.
The converse of Theorem 1 is, in fact, also true, in the following sense. For any game
Γ 6∈ G∗ T is not a lattice and does not have a unique smallest element. To see this consider
any game Γ 6∈ G∗. This game must have at least two own-payoff equivalent pure strategies
for some player which are simultaneous best replies in an open set of strategy profiles.
Thus one can construct τ ∈ T based on only one of these two pure strategies, and τ ′ ∈ T
based only on the other, such that τ(x)∩ τ ′(x) = ∅ for some x ∈ Θ and, thus, τ ∧ τ ′ 6∈ T .
Theorem 1 justifies the name (most) refined best reply correspondence we at-
tached to σ, as it is the unique smallest generalized best reply correspondence and obvi-
ously satisfies σ ⊂ β.
This refined best reply correspondence σ coincides with the best reply correspondence
β almost everywhere (i.e. for all x ∈ Ψ, which is dense in Θ given Γ ∈ G∗). Furthermore
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for strategy profiles x 6∈ Ψ it is constructed in a minimal way to ensure upper hemi–
continuity by requiring that σ(x) includes all pure strategies which are best replies to
some nearby x′ ∈ Ψ and no others.9 For such x any σ(x) must then also include all
convex combinations of all pure strategies in τ(x) by property 4.
In the final paragraph of this section we provide a brief partial characterization of the
refined best reply correspondence in terms of well-known objects from the theory of games.
A detailed characterization of the refined best reply correspondence, its fixed points, and
other objects based on it can be found in our companion paper Balkenborg, Hofbauer,
and Kuzmics (2009). For 2-player games the refined best reply correspondence includes
those and only those best replies that are not weakly dominated and are not equivalent to
a mixture of other pure strategies. The following example (from Balkenborg, Hofbauer,
and Kuzmics (2009)) demonstrates part of this claim.
D E F
A 2,2 1,2 1,2
B 2,1 2,2 0,0
C 2,1 0,0 2,2
Game 4: A Game with equivalent mixed strategies.
In this game strategy A (and similarly D) is equivalent to the mixture of pure strategies
B and C (E and F respectively). However, A is a best reply only on a thin set of mixed-
strategy profiles. In fact, A is best against any x ∈ Θ in which x2E = x2F , the set of
which is a thin set. Thus, while this game is in G∗, and y1A = 0 for all y ∈ S1(x) for all
x ∈ Θ, i.e. A is never in the set of refined best replies. This, for instance, implies that
there are strategically stable equilibria in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) that
are not fixed points of the refined best reply correspondence. For games with more than
two players the set of refined best replies at a given strategy profile x can well be a proper
subset of the set of best replies that are not weakly dominated and not equivalent to a
mixed strategy. For a thorough discussion of this we refer the reader to our companion
paper Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2009).
4 τ -CURB and τ -prep sets
A set R ⊂ S is a strategy selection if R = ×i∈IRi and Ri ⊂ Si, Ri 6= ∅ for all i. For a
strategy selection R let Θ(R) = ×i∈I∆(Ri) denote set of independent strategy mixtures of
the pure strategies in R. A set ϕ ⊂ Θ is a face if there is a strategy selection R such that
ϕ = Θ(R). Note that Θ = Θ(S). Note also that β(x) = Θ(B(x)) and σ(x) = Θ(S(x)).
Generally τ(x) = Θ(T (x)) for some selection T (x) if τ ∈ T PS.
Let A ⊂ Θ. For any τ ∈ T let τ(A) = ×i∈Iτi(A) with τi(A) =
⋃
x∈A τi(x). The
following definition is a generalized version of Basu and Weibull’s (1991) CURB sets.
9Strategies that are unique best replies to some x are called inducible in von Stengel and Zamir (2004).
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For τ ∈ T a strategy selection R is a τ -CURB set if τ(Θ(R)) ⊂ Θ(R). It is a tight
τ -CURB set10 if, in addition τ(Θ(R)) ⊃ Θ(R), and, hence, τ(Θ(R)) = Θ(R). It is a
minimal τ -CURB set if it does not properly contain another τ -CURB set.
These definitions, while well-defined for all τ ∈ T are more natural for τ ∈ T PS as
they are really based on pure strategies. In fact, if τ ∈ T \ T PS then there are typically
not many tight τ -CURB sets.
Note that if τ = β we obtain the original definition of CURB sets of Basu and Weibull
(1991). If τ is the correspondence of all mixtures of pure weakly better replies, as defined
in Section 3, τ -CURB sets are Ritzberger and Weibull’s (1995) cuwbr-sets (closed under
weakly better replies). If, as mentioned in Section 3, Ti(x) be the set of all pure best
replies, except weakly dominated ones, and τ is the correspondence in T PS based on
these Ti(x), τ -CURB sets are Basu and Weibull’s (1991) CURB*-sets.
The lattice structure of (in, fact we only need the partial order on) T allows us to
compare CURB sets based on different generalized best reply correspondences.
Lemma 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ, τ ′ ∈ T with τ ⊂ τ ′. Then any τ ′-CURB set is also a
τ -CURB set. Furthermore, any τ -CURB set for some τ ∈ T is also a σ-CURB set.
Proof: For the first part, let R be a τ ′-CURB set. Thus, by definition, τ ′(Θ(R)) ⊂ Θ(R).
But as τ ⊂ τ ′ we have that τ(Θ(R)) ⊂ τ ′(Θ(R)) ⊂ Θ(R). The second part follows from
the first part of this lemma and the second part of Theorem 1. QED
Lemma 2 implies that the smallest of all τ -CURB sets for any τ ∈ T are the minimal
σ-CURB sets. It turns out, we can characterize minimal σ-CURB sets.
The following definitions are due to Kalai and Samet (1984). A set ϕ ⊂ Θ is a retract
if ϕ = ×i∈Iϕi, where ϕi ⊂ Θi is nonempty, compact, and convex. A set ϕ ⊂ Θ absorbs
another set ϕ′ ⊂ Θ if for all x ∈ ϕ′ we have that β(x) ∩ ϕ 6= ∅. A retract ϕ is an
absorbing retract if it absorbs a neighborhood of itself. It is a persistent retract if it
does not properly contain another absorbing retract. Kalai and Samet (1984) show that,
for games without equivalent strategies, and, hence, for games in G∗, persistent retracts
have to be faces.
Lemma 3 Let Γ ∈ G∗. A strategy selection R ⊂ S is a σ-CURB set if and only if Θ(R)
is an absorbing retract.
Proof: ”⇐”: Let the strategy selection R ⊂ S be such that Θ(R) is an absorbing retract,
i.e., it absorbs a neighborhood of itself. Let U be such a neighborhood of Θ(R). We
then have that for every y ∈ U there is an r ∈ R such that r ∈ B(y). For all r ∈ R let
U r = {y ∈ U : r ∈ B(y)}. We obviously have ⋃r∈R U r = U . Suppose R is not a σ-CURB
set. Then there is a player i ∈ I and a pure strategy si ∈ Si \Ri such that si ∈ S i(x) for
10Note that, for any τ ∈ T , the set of tight τ -CURB sets, together with the empty set, also forms a
(finite and thus complete) lattice. This follows from the fact that the set of all pure strategy selections
is a lattice if we include the empty set. Then τ as a function from subsets of the set of pure strategy sets
to itself is order-preserving, i.e. if R ⊂ R′ then τ(R) ⊂ τ(R′). Thus, by Tarski’s fixed point theorem the
set of all fixed points of τ also forms a lattice. These are tight τ -CURB sets (and the emptyset).
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some x ∈ Θ(R). By the definition of S i we must then have that si ∈ β(y) for all y ∈ O
for some open set O the closure of which contains x. But then, by the finiteness of R,
there is a strategy profile r ∈ R such that U r and O have an intersection which contains
an open set. On this set si and ri are now both best replies. But then, by Lemma 1, si
and ri are equivalent for player i, which, by Proposition 2, contradicts our assumption.
”⇒”: Suppose R ⊂ S is a σ-CURB set. Suppose that Θ(R) is not an absorbing retract.
Then for every neighborhood U of Θ(R) there is a yU ∈ U such that β(yU) ∩ Θ(R) = ∅.
In particular for every such yU there is a player i ∈ I and a pure strategy si ∈ Si \Ri such
that si ∈ Bi(yU). By the finiteness of the number of players and pure strategies and by
the compactness of Θ, this means that there is a convergent subsequence of yU ∈ int(Θ)
such that yU → x for some x ∈ Θ(R) and there is an i ∈ I and an si ∈ Si \ Ri such that
si ∈ Bi(yU) for all such yU . Now one of two things must be true. Either si is a best reply
in an open set with closure intersecting Θ(R), in which case si ∈ Ri given the definition
of σ and a σ-CURB set, which gives rise to a contradiction. Or there is no open set with
closure intersecting Θ(R) such that si is best on the whole open set, in which case there
must be a strategy ri ∈ Ri which is such that ri ∈ β(yU) at least for a subsequence of all
such yU (converging to x), which again gives rise to a contradiction. QED
Lemma 3 immediately implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗. A strategy selection R ⊂ S is a minimal σ-CURB set if and
only if Θ(R) is a persistent retract.
Proof: follows from Lemma 3. QED
Theorem 2, together with Lemma 2, implies that the smallest τ -CURB sets for any
τ ∈ T are Kalai and Samet’s (1984) persistent retracts.
The largest tight β-CURB is the set of rationalizable strategies (Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984)). We can similarly define, for any τ ∈ T , the set of τ -rationalizable
strategies as the largest tight τ -CURB set.
Alternatively we can define τ -rationalizable, more in the original spirit of Bernheim
(1984) and Pearce (1984), in the following way. We shall do this only for τ ∈ T PS. If
τ ∈ T PS then there are correspondences Ti for each player such that τi(x) = ∆(Ti(x)) for
all x ∈ Θ and for all i ∈ I. For A ⊂ Θ let Ti(A) =
⋃
x∈A Ti(x). Let τi(A) = ∆ (Ti(A)).
Let τ(A) = ×i∈Iτi(A). For k ≥ 2 let τ k(A) = τ
(
τ k−1(A)
)
. For A = Θ, τ k(A) is a
decreasing sequence, and we denote τ∞(Θ) =
⋂∞
k=1 τ
k(Θ). A pure strategy profile s ∈ S
is τ -rationalizable if it is an element of the strategy selection R ⊂ S which satisfies
Θ(R) = τ∞(Θ).
We thus have notions of rationalizability for any generalized best reply correspondence
(based on pure strategies).
Lemma 2 immediately implies the following result.
Corollary 1 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ, τ ′ ∈ T such that τ ⊂ τ ′. Then every τ -rationalizable
strategy is also τ ′-rationalizable. In particular, every σ-rationalizable strategy is also τ -
rationalizable for any τ ∈ T .
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This Corollary thus states that the smallest set of τ -rationalizable strategies is obtained
when τ = σ.
It turns out that not only such τ -CURB sets play a role in our analysis of generalized
best reply dynamics in the next section, but also τ -versions (especially the σ-version)
of Voorneveld’s (2004) prep sets. We shall define τ -prep sets only for τ ∈ T PS. Let
τ ∈ T PS. A strategy selection R is a τ-prep set if for all x ∈ Θ(R) and for all i ∈ I
τi(x) ∩ ∆(Ri) 6= ∅. A τ -prep set is minimal if it does not properly contain any other
τ -prep set. Thus, any pure fixed point of τ is a minimal τ -prep set, just as every pure
Nash equilibrium is a minimal (β-)prep set. We shall call a τ -prep set tight if for every
si ∈ Ri si ∈ τi(x) for some x ∈ Θ(R). Minimal τ -prep sets are necessarily tight.
Analogously to Lemma 2 we can compare τ -prep sets for different τ ’s in T PS. Only
the comparison is reversed as the next Lemma states.
Lemma 4 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ, τ ′ ∈ T PS with τ ⊂ τ ′. Then any τ -prep set is also a τ ′-prep
set. Furthermore, any σ-prep set is also a τ -prep set for every τ ∈ T PS.
Proof: For the first part, let R be a τ -prep set. Thus, by definition, for all x ∈ Θ(R) and
for all i ∈ I τi(x) ∩ Θ(R)i 6= ∅. But then, as τ ⊂ τ ′, we also have for all x ∈ Θ(R) and
for all i ∈ I τ ′i(x) ∩Θ(R)i 6= ∅. The second part follows from the first part of this lemma
and the second part of Theorem 1. QED
Thus, Lemmas 2 and 4 imply that the smaller τ ∈ T (in the lattice) the more τ -CURB
sets and the fewer τ -prep sets there are.
5 Generalized best reply dynamics
Gilboa and Matsui (1991), Matsui (1992) and Hofbauer (1995) introduced and studied
the continuous time best reply dynamics (1), which is, modulo a time change, equivalent
to Brown (1951)’s continuous time version of fictitious play. This best reply dynamics is
given by the differential inclusion
x˙ ∈ β(x)− x. (1)
Similarly we can define generalized τ -best reply dynamics, for some τ ∈ T , given by
the differential inclusion
x˙ ∈ τ(x)− x. (2)
The best reply dynamics (1) is obviously a special case of (2) for τ = β. A solution to
(2) is an absolutely continuous function ξ(t, x0) through initial state x0 ∈ Θ, defined for
at least all t ≥ 0, that satisfies (2) for almost all t. 11
11Gilboa and Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992) require additionally the right differentiability of solu-
tions. Hofbauer (1995) argued that all solutions in the sense of differential inclusions should be admitted.
This is natural for applications to discrete approximations (fictitious play, see Hofbauer and Sorin (2006))
or stochastic approximations, see Benaim, Hofbauer, and Sorin (2005). Note that any absolutely contin-
uous solution is automatically Lipschitz, since the right hand side of (1) is bounded. Hofbauer (1995)
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Since the right hand side of (2) is upper-hemi continuous with compact and convex
values, existence of at least one Lipschitz-continuous solution ξ(t, x0) through each initial
state x0 is guaranteed for any τ ∈ T , see (Aubin and Cellina 1984, Chapter 2, Section 1,
Theorem 3, p.98). In general, several solutions can exist through a given initial state.
The objects we are after in this paper can now be defined as follows.
Definition 3 Let Γ ∈ G∗. A face Θ(R) (spanned by a strategy selection R) is a min-
imal asymptotically stable face (MASF) if there is a τ ∈ T such that Θ(R) is
asymptotically stable12 under x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x and for all proper subfaces Θ(R′) ⊂ Θ(R),
with R′ a strategy selection, and for all τ ′ ∈ T Θ(R′) is not asymptotically stable under
x˙ ∈ τ ′(x)− x.
Since σ(x) ⊂ τ(x) for all x, for all τ ∈ T , every solution of the σ-best reply dynamics
x˙ ∈ σ(x)− x. (3)
is also a solution of the τ -best reply dynamics (2). This means that if there is any
substantial difference in the dynamics it is due to the multiplicity of trajectories. In fact,
this is worth stating as a Lemma.
Lemma 5 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ, τ ′ ∈ T such that τ ⊂ τ ′. Let x0 ∈ Θ be an arbitrary initial
state. Then every solution to x˙ ∈ τ(x)− x through x0 is also a solution to x˙ ∈ τ ′(x)− x
through x0.
Proof: This follows immediately from the partial order on T . QED
This Lemma immediately implies another Lemma.
Lemma 6 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ, τ ′ ∈ T such that τ ⊂ τ ′. Let A ⊂ Θ. If A is asymptotically
stable under x˙ ∈ τ ′(x) − x, then A is also asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x.
Furthermore, if A is asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x)− x for some τ ∈ T , then A is
also asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ σ(x)− x.
also provides an explicit construction of all piecewise linear solutions (for 2 person games) and provides
conditions when these constitute all solutions. See also Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), Cressman (2003)
and Sandholm (2010).
12 We call A asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and attractive. A is Lyapunov stable if
for every neighborhood U of A there exists a neighborhood V of A such that all solutions ξ(t, x0) with
x0 ∈ V satisfy ξ(t, x0) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0. A is attractive if there is a neighborhood U of A such that for
every solution ξ(t, x0) with x0 ∈ U its ω–limit set is contained in A:
⋂
T≥0 {ξ(t, x0) : t ≥ T} ⊂ A.
Note that in contrast to Def IX on p.339 in Benaim, Hofbauer, and Sorin (2005), we drop here requirement
(i) invariance. A is invariant if for every x0 ∈ A there is a complete solution ξ(t, x0) ∈ A (i.e., defined
for all positive and negative times t ∈ IR). Consider as example the matching pennies game with the
best reply dynamics. Then the only invariant set is the unique NE which is the minimal asymptotically
stable set of this game. In particular there are no invariant faces under the best reply dynamics. The
only CURB set is the whole strategy space. But this is not invariant, only forward invariant. Therefore
it is not reasonable to require invariance in the definition of MASF.
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Proof: The first part follows directly from Lemma 5. The second part follows from the
first part and the second part of Theorem 1. QED
Lemma 6, thus, implies that minimal asymptotically stable faces (MASF) are those and
only those faces which are the smallest faces that are asymptotically stable under the
(most) refined best reply dynamics x˙ ∈ σ(x) − x. In the remainder of this section we
provide partial characterizations of such faces. We first show that, for any τ ∈ T PS the
τ -best reply dynamics converges to the set of τ -rationalizable strategies13. Furthermore,
every τ -CURB set is asymptotically stable under this dynamics. In particular Basu and
Weibull’s (1991) CURB sets are asymptotically stable under the best reply dynamics and
Kalai and Samet’s (1984) persistent retracts are asymptotically stable under the refined
best reply dynamics. These results are similar to the results of Hurkens (1995), who for
a stochastic learning model a la Young (1993) showed that recurrent sets coincide with
CURB sets or persistent retracts depending on the details of the model. These results
are also similar to that of Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) who show that any strategy
selection which is closed under weakly better replies is asymptotically stable under any
deterministic payoff-positive dynamics.
We then, however, give an example of a game in which a proper sub-face of a persistent
retract is asymptotically stable under the refined best reply dynamics. I.e. a MASF can
be smaller than a persistent retract. We show that a necessary condition for a face to be
asymptotically stable under the refined best reply dynamics (to be a MASF) is that it
constitutes a tight σ-prep set (and must thus be a τ -prep set for all τ ∈ T ).
Theorem 3 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ ∈ T PS. Let R be the strategy selection of S which
spans the set of τ -rationalizable strategies, i.e., Θ(R) = τ∞(Θ). Let si ∈ Si \ Ri. Then
xisi(t)→ 0 for any solution x(·) to x˙ ∈ τ(x)− x for any initial state x(0) ∈ Θ.
Proof: The proof is by induction on k, the iteration in the deletion process, i.e., the k in
τ∞(Θ) =
⋂∞
k=1 τ
k(Θ). Let Rk denote the strategy selection of S which spans τ k(Θ), i.e.,
Θ(Rk) = τ k(Θ). For k = 1 consider an arbitrary strategy si ∈ Si \R1i . By definition then
si 6∈ τi(x) for any x ∈ Θ. Hence its growth rate according to x˙ ∈ τ(x)−x is x˙isi = 0−xisi ,
and therefore
xisi(t) = e
−txisi (4)
for all t ≥ 0, i.e., xisi(t) shrinks exponentially to zero. This proves the statement of
the theorem for si ∈ Si \ R1i . Now assume the statement of the theorem is true for
si ∈ Si \ Rk−1i , i.e., for any such si we have that xisi(t) → 0 for any solution x(·) to
x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x for any initial state x(0) ∈ Θ. Then for any such si and for any x(0) ∈ Θ
there is a finite T such that xisi(t) <  for all t ≥ T . Now by the definition of τ , si ∈ Si\Rki
implies that si 6∈ τi (x(t)) provided  is small enough (or t large enough). But then for all
t ≥ T we again have that x˙isi = 0− xisi and, hence, that xisi(t) shrinks exponentially to
zero. QED
13For β = τ this result is probably well understood. For a related, but weaker statement about the
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies see (Sandholm 2010, Theorem 7.4.2).
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Lemma 7 Let Γ ∈ G∗, R a strategy selection, and τ ∈ T PS. If R is a τ -CURB set then
Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x)− x.
Proof: By the definition of a τ -CURB set and the upper hemi–continuity of τ we have that
for any x ∈ U where U is a sufficiently small neighborhood of Θ(R) it is true that for any
i ∈ I si ∈ τi(x) implies si ∈ Ri. Hence, for any x ∈ U we must have that x˙isi = −xisi for
all i ∈ I and si 6∈ Ri. But then we must have that ||x(t)−Θ(R)||∞ shrinks exponentially
to zero for all x(0) ∈ U . QED
A corollary to Lemma 7 is the following.
Corollary 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗. A robust equilibrium point (Okada (1983)) is asymptotically
stable under the refined best reply dynamics (3).
This follows from the fact that a robust equilibrium point is a singleton persistent retract.
Note that in games in G∗ a robust equilibrium point must be a pure strategy profile.
Note that a game could well have asymptotically stable sets under x˙ ∈ σ(x)−x which
are proper subsets of persistent retracts, but are not faces. The unique Nash equilibrium
of Matching Pennies is an example. It turns out, however, that there may even be faces
which are proper subset of persistent retracts and yet are asymptotically stable under
x˙ ∈ σ(x)− x.
Game 5: Consider the following 4-player game Γ = (I, S, u) with I = {1, 2, 3, 4},
S1 = {H1, T1}, S2 = {H2, T2}, S3 = {D,U}, and S4 = {A,B}. The utility functions are
given as follows.
Players 1 and 2 are playing matching pennies and do not care about other players’
strategies. I.e. their payoffs are given by
H2 T2
H1 2,0 0,2
T1 0,2 2,0
for any strategy pair of players 3 and 4. Player 3’s strategy U is strictly dominated by D.
I.e. u3(s1, s2, U, s4) = 0, while u3(s1, s2, D, s4) = 1 for all s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2, s4 ∈ S4. Player
4’s payoffs are more interesting. Strategy A provides player 4 a payoff of 0 regardless of
all other players’ strategies. I.e. u4(s1, s2, s3, A) = 0 for all s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2, s3 ∈ S3.
Player 4’s payoffs from strategy B are given as follows: u4(T1, T2, U,B) = 1,
u4(T1, T2, D,B) = 0, u4(H1, T2, D,B) = −1, u4(T1, H2, D,B) = −1, u4(H1, T2, U,B) = 0,
u4(T1, H2, U,B) = 0, and finally, u4(H1, H2, D,B) = u4(H1, H2, U,B) = −2.
Claim 1 The unique minimal σ-CURB set in this game is the face spanned by the strategy
selection {H1, T1} × {H2, T2} × {D} × {A,B}.
Proof: That player 1’s part of a minimal σ-CURB set is {H1, T1}, and player 2’s is {H2, T2}
is immediate from the matching pennies structure of their payoffs. That player 3’s part
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of a minimal σ-CURB set is {D} is immediate from the fact that D strictly dominates
U . It thus only remains to be shown that player 4’s part must be {A,B}.
Obviously A is the unique best reply against (H1, H2, D). Thus A is included in
player 4’s part of the minimal σ-CURB set. Furthermore, a short calculation shows
that u4(x1, x2, x3, B) > u4(x1, x2, x3, A) = 0 if and only if x3(U) >
x1(H1)+x2(H2)
1−x1(H1)x2(H2) . The
strategy profiles satisfying this condition form an open set. It contains the strategy profile
(T1, T2, D,A) in its boundary. Therefore B is included in player 4’s part of the minimal
σ-CURB set as well. QED
Claim 2 In this game, the face spanned by the strategy selection {H1, T1} × {H2, T2} ×
{D} × {A} is asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ σ(x)− x.
Proof: Consider a solution, ζ, to x˙ ∈ σ(x)− x through some initial point x0 close to this
face. By the matching pennies structure of player 1 and 2’s payoffs we must have that
ζ1H1(t, x
0) → 1
2
as t → ∞. Also ζ2H2(t, x0) → 12 as t → ∞. Furthermore we must have
ζ3D(t, x
0) → 1 as t → ∞ by the fact that D strictly dominates U . In fact we must have
that ζ3D(t, x
0) > ζ3D(t
′, x0) if t > t′.
Note that this game has only one Nash equilibrium (1
2
H1 +
1
2
T1,
1
2
H2 +
1
2
T2, D,A).
Given the above observations, it must be true that ζ4A(t, x
0) → 1 as t → ∞ for all
x0 ∈ Θ.
The only thing left to show is that the face spanned by {H1, T1}×{H2, T2}×{D}×{A}
is also Lyapunov stable. In order to show this, we must prove that for any neighborhood
V of the face there is another neighborhood U ⊂ V such that any solution to x˙ ∈ σ(x)−x
with initial state in U must stay in V for all t ≥ 0.
Let V be a neighborhood such that for any x ∈ V we have x3(U) <  for some  > 0.
Let E() ⊂ Θ denote the -box around state (T1, T2, D,A). I.e. x ∈ E if and only if
x1(H1) ≤ , x2(H2) ≤ , x3(U) ≤ , and x4(B) ≤ .
For x0 ∈ V \ E(2), i.e. x0 is a state outside the 2-box around (T1, T2, D,A). Given
the matching pennies structure of the game between players 1 and 2, it is easy to see that
ζ(t, x0) 6∈ E() for any t ≥ 0. Thus, by the argument in the proof of claim 1, B is never
best against ζ(t, x0) for any t ≥ 0, and thus ζ(t, x0)4(B), will shrink to 0 as t→∞.
For x0 ∈ E(2) things are different. For some such initial states x0, ζ(t, x0) can go
through E() for some time. For part of this time, indeed, player 4’s strategy B could
be best and could grow. However, there is an upper bound on this time ζ(t, x0) spends
within E() which depends on . For  small enough, the direction ζ(t, x0) takes for
players 1 and 2 must be towards T1, H2 (irrespective of what players 3 and 4 do). Given
that T2 is thus not best anywhere for player 2 in this -box around (T1, T2, D,A) means
that T2 will shrink (or H2 grow). In fact we must have ζ(t, x
0)2(T2) = x
0
2(T2)e
−t. In the
worst case, we, thus, have that ζ(T, x0) 6∈ E() for all t ≥ T if T = − ln(1 − ). Thus,
− ln(1− ) is the longest time possible ζ(t, x0) stays within E() for any x0 ∈ E(2). Part
of this time, at most all of it, B could be (uniquely) best for player 4. Thus, ζ(t, x0)4(B)
could grow for up to this amount of time. Given x0 ∈ V and, thus, x04(B) ≤  we have
that ζ(t, x0)4(B) ≤ 1 − (1 − )eln(1−) = 1 − (1 − )2 < 2. As  → 0 this expression
tends to 0 as well. This implies that for any neighborhood V of the face spanned by
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{H1, T1} × {H2, T2} × {D} × {A} there is another neighborhood U such that x3(U) ≤ 
for some  > 0 (small enough) and all x ∈ V such that ζ(t, x0) ∈ V for all t ≥ 0 and all
x0 ∈ U . QED
Note that σ = β in this game. Therefore the converse of Lemma 7 is not true for the
best reply dynamics as well. The difference in the seemingly discrepant conclusions of
Claim 1 and 2 is driven by the following observation. B is the unique best reply for player
4 in a cone shaped set of opponent strategy profiles with apex (T1, T2, D). Hence B is
included in each σ−CURB set. Still, the face spanned by the smaller strategy selection
{H1, T1} × {H2, T2} × {D} × {A} is asymptotically stable: The trajectories starting in
this cone leave it quickly, the more quickly the closer the starting point is to the (smaller)
face. Thus there is a vanishing amount of time in which B can grow.
Lemma 8 Let Γ ∈ G∗ and R a strategy selection. If Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under
the τ -best reply dynamics x˙ ∈ τ(x)−x, for τ ∈ T PS, then R is a τ -prep set. Furthermore,
if for all strategy selections R′, which are proper subsets of R, Θ(R′) is not asymptotically
stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x (i.e. Θ(R) is a minimal asymptotically stable set) then R is a
tight τ -prep set.
Proof: As τ ∈ T PS for every x ∈ Θ there is a Ti(x) such that τi(x) = ∆(Ti(x)) for all
i ∈ I. Now suppose Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x and R is not a
τ -prep set. Then there is an x ∈ Θ(R) and a player i ∈ I such that Ti(x) ∩ Ri = ∅.
But then, by the upper-hemi continuity of τ , there is a neighborhood of x such that
Ti(x
′) ⊂ Ti(x) for all x′ in this neighborhood. Thus a solution to x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x starting
from a state in the interior of this neighborhood must spend a finite amount of time within
this neighborhood. In this finite amount of time all strategies in Ri must shrink. Thus
Θ(R) is not asymptotically stable, which is a contradiction, proving the first part of this
Lemma. To prove the second part, suppose R is not a tight τ -prep set and asymptotically
stable. Then there is a player i ∈ I and si ∈ Ri such si 6∈ Ti(x) for any x ∈ Θ(R). But
then R′, derived from R by letting R′i = Ri \ {si} and R′j = Rj for all j 6= i, is also
asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x)− x. QED
Not every τ -prep set is asymptotically stable under x˙ ∈ τ(x) − x. To see this, for
τ = σ, consider the following game.
D E F
A 1,1 1,1 2,1
B 1,1 0,0 3,1
C 1,2 1,3 1,1
Game 6: This game is taken from Samuelson (1992).
It is a symmetric game. Note that strategies C and F are weakly dominated. The unique
persistent retract of this game is spanned by {A,B}×{D,E}. There are three singleton σ-
prep sets. These are {(A,D)}, {(A,E)}, and {(B,D)}. None of these are asymptotically
stable under the refined best reply dynamics. Thus, none of these are MASF. To see this
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note that x˙ ∈ σ(x)−x has a solution starting at (A,D) that gradually takes play towards
(A,E).
We are finally in a position to prove our main Theorem.
Theorem 4 Let Γ ∈ G∗. If R is a strategy selection such that Θ(R) is a persistent retract
(minimal σ-CURB set), then Θ(R) contains a MASF. Conversely, if R is a strategy
selection such that Θ(R) is a MASF, then R is a tight σ-prep set.
Proof: For the first part suppose that R is a strategy selection such that Θ(R) is a
persistent retract (minimal σ-CURB set). Then that Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under
x˙ ∈ σ(x) − x follows from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. Thus, it either is a MASF or it
contains one. The second part follows from Lemma 8. QED
If one is interested in (partially) characterizing not only MASFs but also its asymptoti-
cally stable subsets one approach could be to define an appropriate version of Balkenborg
and Schlag’s (2007) strict equilibrium sets based, however, on the refined best reply cor-
respondence. We conjecture that these sets, appropriately defined, are asymptotically
stable under x˙ ∈ σ(x)− x.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we endeavored to find the smallest faces of the set of mixed strategy pro-
files that can be justifiably called evolutionary stable. In order to do so we introduce
generalizations of the best reply correspondence which satisfy four, we believe reasonable,
criteria. The criteria are as follows. A generalized best reply correspondence must have
a product structure, as we want players to choose independently. At least one best reply
must always be available to players. It must be point-wise closed and convex. Closedness
is more of a technical requirement, but convexity derives from the desire to have players
randomize arbitrarily between their generalized best replys. Finally we require a gen-
eralized best reply correspondence to be upper hemi–continuous. This is an important
technical requirement as it guarantees that such a generalized best reply correspondence
has a fixed point and the differential inclusion based on it always has a solution. In terms
of player behavior it translates to the requirement that if one were to perturb the current
strategy profile of the opponents a little bit this player will not choose a new strategy
which was not formerly in the set of generalized best-replies.
We define a generalized best reply dynamics as an appropriate differential inclusion
based on the respective generalized best reply correspondence. We define a minimal
asymptotically stable face (MASF) as a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles which
is asymptotically stable under some such generalized deterministic evolutionary process
with the additional property that it does not properly contain another face which is also
asymptotically stable under some (possibly different) generalized best reply dynamics.
We show (Theorem 1) that the set of all generalized best reply correspondences (and,
hence, dynamics) is, for most games, a complete lattice with a unique smallest element.
We call this smallest element the refined best reply correspondence (and dynamics).
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The main results in this paper offer a partial characterization of minimal asymptot-
ically stable faces (MASFs). We show (Theorem 2) that every persistent retract (Kalai
and Samet (1984)) is the same as a minimal CURB-set (Basu and Weibull (1991)) based
on, however, the refined best reply correspondence, and contains a MASF (Theorem 4).
A MASF can be a proper subface of a persistent retract, as we show by example, and
must be (Theorem 4) a tight prep-set (Voorneveld (2004)) based on, again, the refined
best reply correspondence. Thus, MASFs are sets somewhere “in-between” CURB and
prep sets based on the refined best reply correspondence.
Our findings are, thus, reminiscent of Hurkens’s (1995) findings that a stochastic best
reply learning process based on semi-robust best-replies leads to play eventually leading
to a persistent retract. Altogether this suggests that while it is difficult to justify Nash
equilibrium behavior, either epistemically or through evolution or learning, yet alone any
of its point-wise refinements or even set-wise refinements such as Kohlberg and Mertens’s
(1986) strategically stable sets, there are relatively small sets of strategy profiles which are
justifiable through learning. Furthermore every persistent retract, or CURB set based on
the refined best reply correspondence, contains such a set, while it is a necessary condition
for a face to be a MASF that this face be spanned by a tight prep-set based, again, on
the refined best reply correspondence.
We, thus, suggest that in applied game theory work MASFs, or at least appropriate
variations of CURB sets, persistent retracts, and prep sets, which are as of now not used
to a great extent14, may be very apt choices for a solution concept in some contexts.
A On the generic equivalence of own-payoff equiva-
lence and payoff equivalence
Adapting a notion of Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2007) for perfect information
games, let a normal form game satisfy the Single Payoff Condition (SPC) if all own-
payoff equivalent pure strategies are also payoff equivalent. Not every game satisfies the
SPC: a player other than i might not be indifferent between player i’s own-payoff equiva-
lent strategies (as is the case in Game 3). Thus, our restriction that the game should have
no own-payoff equivalent strategies for any player i is a stronger requirement than saying
the game has to be in semi-reduced normal form (see e.g., page 147 in Ritzberger (2002)).
However, games not satisfying the SPC are exceptional. Trivially, for generic normal form
games there are neither own-payoff nor payoff equivalent strategies and hence the SPC
holds. This is of little interest because most important classes of normal from games such
as normal forms of extensive form games or of finitely repeated games are non-generic.
Requiring genericity conflicts with imposing any additional structure on the class of games
considered.15 In this appendix we identify a condition on a class of normal form games
which implies that the SPC holds generically within this class. This condition is shown
14Notable exceptions are e.g., Kalai and Samet (1985), Balkenborg (1993), Blume (1994, 1996), Hurkens
(1996), van Damme and Hurkens (1996), and Gordon (2006).
15For an illuminating discussion on this point see Mertens (2004).
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to be satisfied by the classes of normal forms of extensive form games, of finitely repeated
games, and of cheap talk games. Thus, the restriction to games satisfying SPC and hence,
after the identification of payoff equivalent strategies, to games in G∗, is not a severe one.
Definition 4 A normal form game satisfies the Single Payoff Condition (SPC) if the
following holds for all players i ∈ I. Two strategies si, s′i ∈ Si satisfy the equations
ui (si, s−i) = ui (s′i, s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i only if also the equations
uj (si, s−i) = uj (s′i, s−i)
holds for all j ∈ I and all s−i ∈ S−i.
Definition 5 For a given set of strategy combinations S consider a family of normal
form games {Γµ}µ∈O given by utility functions
ui (s, µ) (5)
for s ∈ S and i ∈ I, which depend on a vector of parameters µ taken from a nonempty open
set O in some Euclidian space IRk. We call the family analytic if all ui (s, µ) are analytic
functions in µ for given s ∈ S.16 We say that the family satisfies the Functional Single
Payoff Condition if the following holds for all players i ∈ I. Two strategies si, s′i ∈ Si
satisfy the functional identities
ui (si, s−i, µ) = ui (s′i, s−i, µ) for all µ ∈ O
for all s−i ∈ S−i only if also the functional identities
uj (si, s−i, µ) = uj (s′i, s−i, µ) for all µ ∈ O
hold for all j ∈ I and all s−i ∈ S−i.
Proposition 3 Suppose the analytic family of games {Γµ}µ∈O satisfies the Functional
Single Payoff Condition. Then for generic µ ∈ O the game Γµ satisfies the Single Payoff
Condition.
Proof: Fix i ∈ I, si, s′i ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I such that uj (si, s−i, µ) and
uj (s
′
i, s−i, µ) are distinct as functions in µ. Then the set of parameter values µ for which
uj (si, s−i, µ) = uj (s′i, s−i, µ) (6)
16An analytic function is a function that is locally described by power series. The notion covers most
functions arising in applications, in particular linear and rational functions or functions like ex or ln(x).
In our examples the functions are always linear.
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is a closed lower dimensional analytic set because the function is analytic (see e.g., Gun-
ning and Rossi (1965)). Because there are finitely many choices of i ∈ I, si, s′i ∈ Si
s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I to consider we find that for µ outside a lower dimensional analytic
subset D of O the identity (6) for some i ∈ I, si, s′i ∈ Si s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I implies the
identity (6) for all i ∈ I, si, s′i ∈ Si s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I and also µ ∈ O. In particular,
the SPC condition holds for all µ /∈ D. QED
Example 1 In a cheap talk game players first send simultaneously and independently
public messages mi from message spaces Mi. After all players have received the combi-
nation of messages
m = (m1, · · · ,mn) ∈M = ×i∈IMi (7)
they choose simultaneously and independently actions ai ∈ Ai. A pure strategy in such
a game consists of a message mi and a function fi : M → Ai. The play of any strategy
combination s will result in a combination of messages m ∈ M and a combination of
actions
a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ A = ×i∈IAi, (8)
where, in a cheap talk game, only the latter is payoff relevant. In this example the
parameter space is IRA×I . For µ ∈ IRA×I we define the utility function by
ui (s, µ) = µa,i (9)
where a is the combination of actions induced by s. The utility function is then for each
s ∈ S the projection onto a particular component of the vector µ. The identity
ui (si, s−i, µ) = ui (s′i, s−i, µ) (10)
can only hold for all µ if both functions project onto the same component of µ, i.e., if the
play of both (si, s−i) and (s′i, s−i) results in the same combination of actions a, although
in possibly different combinations of messages. (If (si, s−i) and (s′i, s−i) would result in
different combinations of actions a and a′ the equality would not hold in the game where
all players get 1 after a and 0 after a′.) If this is the case then, by construction,
uj (si, s−i, µ) = µa,j = uj (s′i, s−i, µ) (11)
for all j and µ. Thus Proposition 3 applies and we conclude that the SPC holds generically
in cheap talk games.
Example 2 In an extensive game without chance moves the play of any pure strat-
egy combination results in a terminal node t ∈ T . In this case the parameter space for a
given extensive form is IRT×I and the utility function is ui (s, µ) = µt,i if s induces t. The
same arguments as for cheap talk games imply that the SPC holds in generic extensive
form games with no random moves. Notice, though, that almost no extensive game with
the extensive form of a cheap talk game is itself a cheap talk game. Hence the previous
result is not a special case of this one.
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Example 3 In an extensive game with chance moves the parameter space remains as in
the previous example, but the utility function becomes
ui (s, µ) =
∑
t∈T
ptµt,i (12)
where pt is the probability with which terminal node t is reached when the pure strategy
combination s is played. Clearly, the equation
ui (si, s−i, µ) =
∑
t∈T
ptµt,i =
∑
t∈T
p′tµt,i = ui (s
′
i, s−i, µ) (13)
can only hold for all µ ∈ RT×I if pt = p′t for all t ∈ T . Thus the SPC holds for generic
extensive form games even with chance moves.
Example 4 In a finitely repeated game with perfect monitoring, no discounting and t ≥ 0
periods, the play of a pure strategy combination s results in a sequence (a1, a2, · · · , at) of
combinations of actions in the stage game. The payoff to a player can be written as∑
a∈A
ks,aµa,i (14)
where the parameter µa,i is player i’s payoff in the stage game from the combination of
actions a and ks,a is the number of times a is played in the sequence (a1, a2, · · · , at). If
for two strategy combinations s = (si, s−i) and s′ = (s′i, s−i)
ui (s, µ) =
∑
a∈A
ks,aµa,i =
∑
a∈A
ks′,aµa,i = ui (s
′, µ) (15)
holds for all µ ∈ RA×I then ks,a = ks′,a for all a ∈ A and, hence,
ui (s, µ) =
∑
a∈A
ks,aµa,i =
∑
a∈A
ks′,aµa,i = ui (s
′, µ) (16)
Again, the SPC holds generically in repeated games.
Example 5 Consider finally the class of normal form games which satisfy for every i ∈ I,
every s−i ∈ S−i and any si s′i ∈ Si the equation
ui (si, s−i, µ) = ui (s′i, s−i, µ) (17)
If at least one player has two strategies, then this class does not satisfy the Functional
Single Payoff Condition. Almost all games in this class violate the SPC.
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